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Colorado's final objection challenged the value of crop losses
attributable to the Compact violations. The parties disagreed over how
much additional yield the missing water would have produced.
Kansas' experts relied on a hypothesis of a linear relationship between
water and crop yields, with an estimated reduction in yield due to
environmental factors. Colorado's expert proposed a competing
model, but had to withdraw it when confronted with flaws in his data.
Thus, the Court overruled Colorado's objection because Colorado was
unable to successfully challenge Kansas' experts and provide a
plausible alternative cost estimate.
The Court remanded the case to the Special Master for
preparation of a final judgment specifying the amount of damages that
Colorado must pay.
John A. Helfrich
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
FIRST CIRCUIT
Pepperell Assoc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 246 F.3d
15 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding the Environmental Appeals Board's
decision unreviewable, based on the record's substantial evidence).
Pepperell Associates ("Pepperell") operated a small business,
which accidentally released 350 gallons of oil into United States
navigable waterways. After the spill, the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") brought a three-count administrative penalty action.
Both parties appealed the Administrative LawJudges' ("ALJ") decision
to the Environmental Appeals Board ("EAB"). Pepperell petitioned
for judicial review of the EAB's decision in the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit. However, the court refused the petition
because EAB based its decision on the records' substantial evidence.
Pepperell asserted four issues for review. First, Pepperell argued its
facility was not subject to the Clean Water Act's ("CWA") Spill
Prevention Control and Countermeasures ("SPCC") regulations
because the location made it unreasonable to foresee a discharge into
navigable waters. Second, Pepperell argued that between November 1,
1996 and July 14, 1997, SPCC regulations did not apply to it because its
underground oil capacity was less than SPCC'sjurisdictional threshold.
Third, Pepperell argued that its 20,000 gallon, aboveground storage
tank created a new feature, and thus was not a modification. Finally,
Pepperell claimed EAB miscalculated the penalty.
The court explained that EAB was entitled to substantial deference
if it followed its own procedures and met statutory requirements. The
court would only set aside EAB's findings if the record, taken as a
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whole, failed to support a violation. The court examined the facts and
concluded that EAB had based its decision on substantial evidence.
SPCC regulations apply to owners and operators of nontransportation-related on-shore and offshore facilities storing oil and
oil products which, because of their location, might discharge oil in
harmful quantities into navigable waters.
Thus, EAB correctly
concluded SPCC regulations applied to Pepperell's facility. EAB
affirmed the existence of a reasonably foreseeable discharge based on
Pepperell's location. In response, Pepperell argued that the facility's
location in a dense, urban area, removed from navigable waters,
resulted in unforeseeable discharge. Nonetheless, the court affirmed
EAB's decision, which not only refuted Pepperell's narrowly construed
location test, but also confirmed that it was reasonably foreseeable the
facility, taken as whole, could discharge into navigable waters.
EAB also correctly concluded that SPCC regulations governed
Pepperell's facility between November 1, 1996 and July 14, 1997. The
CWA exempts facilities otherwise subject to SPCC jurisdiction if their
storage capacity is below a specified level. Pepperell argued it was
exempt under the capacity exception because some storage tanks were
disconnected and other tanks lacked a foreseeable path for oil to
reach navigable waters. Pepperell also argued that the regulations did
not define the storage capacity. EAB asserted that a tank must be
taken out of service, cleaned, capped, and altered, and the
foreseeability test does not determine capacity. The court deferred to
EAB's expertise and its interpretation of its own agency regulations,
and rejected Pepperell's argument.
Pepperell also argued that its newly constructed aboveground
storage tank was a new construction, not a modification, because it
removed old storage tanks in July and did not complete the new tank
until October. However, EAB said such a in gap time, particularly
when the owners and operators controlled the time period, did not
convert an existing facility into a new one. Pepperell asserted that this
determination was arbitrary. However, the court agreed with EAB, and
held that Pepperell had modified the facility.
Finally, Pepperell challenged EAB's penalty decision. Pepperell
maintained that EAB failed to consider its reimbursement to the state
of Maine for part of the cleanup costs. Pepperell argued that EAB
must consider this factor because the statute required the penalty
assessor to consider other matters, as justice required. The court
reviewed the penalties under the CWA for abuse of discretion, and
concluded that although Pepperell had a reasonable argument, it
failed to show EAB's actions met such a threshold. Thus, the court
denied Pepperell's petition for review on all points.
KirstinE. McMillan

